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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
 
No. 13-3513 
 
 
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
       JEROME LAMONT KELLY, 
 
                              Appellant 
 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 
 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 2-08-cr-00374-012) 
District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti 
 
 
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING 
 
 
Present: McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, FUENTES, 
SMITH, FISHER, CHAGARES, JORDAN, HARDIMAN, 
GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, 
RESTREPO, SCIRICA and ROTH,1 Circuit Judges 
 
The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant in the 
above-entitled case having been submitted to the judges who 
participated in the decision of this Court and to all the other 
available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, 
and no judge who concurred in the decision having asked for 
rehearing, and a majority of the judges of the circuit in 
regular service not having voted for rehearing, the petition for 
rehearing by the panel and the Court en banc, is denied. 
                                                            
1 The votes of Judge Scirica and Judge Roth are limited to 
panel rehearing only. 
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    BY THE COURT, 
 
    s/Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr.          
      Circuit Judge 
 
Dated:  May 26, 2016 
SLC/cc: Donovan J. Cocas, Esq. 
  Robert Epstein, Esq. 
  Rebecca R. Haywood, Esq. 
  Michael L. Ivory, Esq. 
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No. 13-3513 UNITED STATES v. JEROME LAMONT 
KELLY 
 
OPINION DISSENTING SUR DENIAL OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING EN BANC 
 
MCKEE, Chief Judge, with whom AMBRO, SMITH and 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judges, join. 
  
I appreciate that the panel’s decision in this case was 
dictated by circuit precedent and that my colleagues therefore 
felt compelled to affirm the jury’s determination that Kelly’s 
membership in the Alford drug distribution conspiracy had 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, I take the 
unusual step of filing this opinion sur denial of rehearing to 
explain why we have made a mistake by not availing 
ourselves of this opportunity to reexamine our jury 
instructions in drug conspiracies.  I do so even though this 
appeal has been resolved in a non-precedential opinion 
because our current approach to informing jurors how to 
distinguish between a purchaser from a drug conspiracy and a 
member of that conspiracy is so meaningless that it presents 
the illusion of an objective standard while furnishing no 
guidance to jurors who must make this crucial distinction.   
 
Our current standard for channeling a jury’s inquiry in 
such prosecutions fails to provide a jury with sufficient 
guidance to allow jurors to appropriately differentiate 
between customers and co-conspirators.  Although some of 
our factors may be relevant to this inquiry, the irrelevant 
factors I discuss below create the very real danger of placing 
a thumb on the conspiratorial side of the scale and thereby 
tipping the balance in favor of a conviction for conspiracy 
when only a buyer-seller relationship has been established.  
Because there is no way of knowing how this jury would have 
viewed the circumstantial evidence against Kelly if that 
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additional weight had not been added to the conspiratorial 
side of the scale, I believe this case “involves a question of 
exceptional importance,” meriting en banc reconsideration.  
Fed. R. App. P. 35(a). 
  
I. 
 
In order to establish that a purchaser of illegal drugs is 
a member of the conspiracy that is selling them, the 
Government must generally prove beyond a reasonable doubt: 
“(1) a shared unity of purpose; (2) an intent to achieve a 
common illegal goal; and (3) an agreement to work toward 
that goal, which [the defendant] knowingly joined.”  United 
States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2010).   Although 
proof of membership in a conspiracy can certainly be satisfied 
by circumstantial evidence, circumstances that merely 
establish “a simple buyer-seller relationship, without any 
prior or contemporaneous understanding beyond the sales 
agreement itself, [are] insufficient to establish that the buyer 
was a member of the seller’s conspiracy.”  United States v. 
Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 343 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United 
States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 198 (3d Cir. 1999)).  
Accordingly, our current jury instructions give undue weight 
to the fact that one has purchased from someone who is a 
member of a conspiracy, and they fail to provide the 
analytical compass that would help jurors place such 
purchases in their proper context.  
 
In United States v. Gibbs we note several factors 
relevant to determining whether an alleged co-conspirator 
“has knowledge of the conspiracy to the extent that his drug 
purchases are circumstantial evidence of his intent to join that 
conspiracy.”  Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 199.  These include “the 
length of affiliation between the defendant and the 
conspiracy; whether there is an established method of 
payment; the extent to which transactions are standardized; 
and whether there is a demonstrated level of mutual trust.”  
Id. (citing United States v. Hach, 162 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 
1998)). An additional factor provided in Gibbs is “whether 
the buyer's transactions involved large amounts of drugs.”  Id. 
(citing United States v. Flores, 149 F.3d 1272, 1277 (10th 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 808 (7th 
Cir. 1994)).  In writing the opinion in Gibbs, Judge Becker 
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took pains to point out the problems with the standard that we 
were using to differentiate between mere purchasers of drugs 
from a drug conspiracy and members of that conspiracy.  He 
explained in a footnote: 
 
Judge Becker believes that a 
buyer’s knowledge that he is 
buying drugs from someone 
involved in a larger conspiracy 
does not lead directly to the 
inference that the buyer intended 
to join that conspiracy and 
achieve a common goal with its 
conspirators. He urges a course 
correction under which this 
precept would be abandoned in 
favor of the approach to buyer-
seller relationships in the 
conspiracy context taken by the 
Seventh Circuit Court in an 
important opinion by Judge 
Flaum. See United States v. 
Townsend, 924 F.3d 1385 (7th 
Cir. 1991).  
 
Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 198 n.3.  Judge Becker then goes on to 
explain why the Townsend analysis provides more substantive 
and meaningful guidance to jurors than the approach we 
continue to take.   
 
 This case illustrates why our current jurisprudence 
creates little more than an illusory distinction between buyers 
and co-conspirators and thereby creates the very real risk that 
the co-conspiratorial net will be cast over those who merely 
purchase from a drug conspiracy.  Indeed, this case represents 
a quintessential example of this problem.  
 
II. 
 
Kelly made more than one purchase from the Alford 
conspiracy for personal use, and he also resold some of the 
drugs that he purchased.  However, although there were over 
60,000 recorded conversations with the leader of the 
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conspiracy, Kelly appears on the underwhelming sum of 
seven of them, and there is no evidence that any of these 
conversations tied Kelly into doing anything other than 
buying from Alford (and getting information about how to 
convert the purchased product to crack cocaine).  In addition, 
to the extent that the testifying co-conspirators in this case 
knew Kelly, none named him as a member of the conspiracy.  
Rather, the Government’s own witnesses said Kelly was 
merely a customer, or a “lick.”  See J.A. at 1240, 1242.  He 
did not advance funds to the members of the conspiracy or 
have any financial interest or stake in the conspiracy, nor is 
there any evidence that he was involved in its operations and 
objectives in any way beyond his purchases. 
 
In affirming his conviction for conspiracy, my 
colleagues are partially persuaded by the phone records in 
which Kelly and Alford discussed third parties in a way that 
would enable a rational jury to conclude that Kelly was aware 
of Alford’s transactions with drug suppliers and, by 
extension, of Alford’s role within a larger operation.  
However, as Judge Becker noted in Gibbs, a buyer’s 
knowledge of the larger conspiracy “does not lead directly to 
the inference that the buyer intended to join that conspiracy 
and achieve a common goal with its conspirators.”  Gibbs, 
190 F.3d at 198 n.3.  The Government attempts to explain 
away this evidentiary void by claiming that this is only 
relevant where the existence of the larger conspiracy itself is 
in question.  See Gov’t Response at 5 (quoting United States 
v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2001)).  The Government’s 
rejoinder based on Pressler is neither persuasive nor helpful.  
In Pressler, we held that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that the defendant (Shreffler) was a co-conspirator 
as opposed to a mere purchaser.  We explained:  
 
The Government demonstrated 
that the main person from whom 
Shreffler obtained his heroin, . . . 
Caban, also distributed the drug to 
many others, and that some of the 
people to whom Caban sold 
heroin had been referred to him 
by Shreffler.  The evidence also 
established that many of the 
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people to whom Shreffler and 
Caban provided heroin sold the 
drug themselves, including a man 
with whom Shreffler lived for 
several months.  And the 
Government proved that Shreffler 
was aware of all of the above 
facts.  
 
256 F.3d at 147.  That evidence is more suggestive of a 
conspiratorial relationship than the evidence that purports to 
tie Kelly to the Alford conspiracy here.  Yet, we held the 
evidence was insufficient to establish a conspiratorial 
relationship between Shreffler and Caban.  “[T]here was 
simply no evidence that Shreffler ever agreed to work with 
either his seller or his buyers to achieve a common goal or 
advance a common interest.”  Id.  There is also no evidence 
that Kelly ever agreed to work with Alford to achieve a 
common goal or advance a common interest. 
 
The Government’s attempt to limit the force of Gibbs 
and to distinguish Pressler by suggesting that the concern 
expressed by Judge Becker in Gibbs is only relevant where 
the existence of a conspiracy is in question is simply wrong.  
Pressler did distinguish Gibbs by explaining that “[i]n Gibbs 
there was no question that a cocaine distribution ring headed 
by . . . Gibbs . . . existed; the dispute was whether [a 
purchaser of large amounts of heroin from Gibbs] had agreed 
to join the conspiracy.”  256 F.3d at 151.  Although that 
distinction was helpful to the analysis in Pressler, when 
viewed in its proper context, it is a distinction without any 
analytical difference here.  Rather, the language the 
Government relies upon merely established that where a 
conspiracy is shown to exist, and the conspiratorial “gang has 
divided the neighborhood into zones in which only a single 
dealer may operate, then the fact that the defendant 
consistently sells . . . drugs [in a zone controlled by the 
conspiracy] would provide evidence that the defendant both 
knew of the existence of the conspiracy and was a participant 
in it.”  Id.  That is simply not the situation here. There is not 
even a suggestion that Kelly resold drugs in an area 
exclusively controlled by the Alford conspiracy, and the 
Government has not argued to the contrary.  That was also 
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not the situation in Pressler where we held that the evidence 
was not sufficient to establish that a purchaser was a co-
conspirator. 
 
Nevertheless, relying upon the factors we have 
previously endorsed, the District Court  determined that the 
circumstantial evidence, viewed “in the light most favorable 
to the government, supports the ‘reasonable and logical 
inference’ that Kelly’s interactions with the members of the 
Alford conspiracy ‘could not have been carried on except as 
the result of a preconceived scheme or common 
understanding’” such that “[a] reasonable jury could have 
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Kelly knew he was 
dealing with a larger drug operation when he purchased 
cocaine . . . , that he shared the Alford conspiracy’s goal of 
selling cocaine and crack cocaine for profit, and that he 
worked with members of the Alford conspiracy to achieve 
that goal.”  J.A. at 40 (quoting Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 197).   Yet, 
it is highly likely that, had the jury been afforded a 
meaningful metric to assess this evidence, it would have 
concluded that the Government had failed to prove that Kelly 
was anything more than a mere purchaser of drugs and that he 
ever intended to join the Alford drug conspiracy or advance 
its criminal objectives. 
 
As Judge Becker argued in Gibbs, knowledge of a 
larger conspiracy can easily be attributed to anyone who 
purchases illegal drugs from a cocaine distribution ring.  
Everyone who purchases cocaine in the United States should 
understand that the seller is but one link in a larger supply 
chain because the coca leaves that are necessary to produce 
cocaine are not grown in the United States. Thus, one who 
buys cocaine knows that his seller is part of a larger network. 
Yet, no fair system of jurisprudence should allow that 
knowledge to be considered as circumstantial evidence that 
the purchaser thereby intended to join the distribution 
network or to advance its illegal objectives. That remains true 
even if the purchaser then resells any of those drugs, absent 
proof of some arrangement with the original seller or his 
agent that would establish more than a buyer-seller 
relationship (such as selling in a neighborhood that is under 
the exclusive control of the initial seller’s organization). 
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Here, the panel’s analysis to the contrary ignores the 
fact that a college student who purchases a quantity of 
cocaine and resells some of it to his/her roommate knows that 
the cocaine almost certainly came from out of the Country.   
Because the purchase money obviously furthers the purpose 
of a drug cartel (i.e., profiting from the sale of illegal drugs), 
the purchase money contributes to the common illegal goal 
and an agreement can certainly be inferred to “work toward 
that goal.”  NPO at 3.  However, that is not the least bit 
helpful in separating mere purchasers from those who agree 
(however tacitly) to advance the conspiratorial entity.  
 
It is for this reason that Judge Becker recommended in 
Gibbs that we follow the Seventh Circuit’s approach to buyer-
seller relationships in the context of drug conspiracies rather 
than instructing a jury to consider whether a buyer had 
knowledge of the larger conspiracy.  We should ask instead 
“whether the buyer can be said to have a stake in the larger 
conspiracy.”  Id.  In other words, in order to hold a defendant 
liable as a member of the larger conspiracy, the Government 
should have to prove that the defendant actually intended to 
join the larger organization and advance its objectives and 
goals.  Judge Becker believed that this framework, “which 
may often render a buyer a conspirator with his seller but not 
with the larger conspiracy, is more consistent with both the 
precepts of agency law (which undergirds conspiracy law) 
and with reality.”  Id.  I agree, and it is past the time that we 
should have adopted something analogous to the Seventh 
Circuit’s buyer-seller relationship inquiry, also adopted by the 
Second Circuit, which would examine whether the buyer has 
a stake in the larger conspiracy.  See United States v. Clay, 37 
F.3d 338, 341 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Brock,  789 
F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[A] good customer—even a very 
good customer—of a drug organization may still be just a 
customer, not a co-conspirator, if the evidence cannot support 
an inference of mutual dependency or a common stake.”).  
 
I realize, of course, that “[d]etermining whether 
someone has ‘a stake in the venture’ is easier said than 
done—especially [when limited to] circumstantial evidence.”  
United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 2013).  
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit has recently reevaluated the 
factors it uses to analyze a buyer’s “stake” in a seller’s larger 
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conspiracy, recognizing that most of the previously accepted 
factors “d[o] not actually distinguish conspiracies from buyer-
seller relationships.”  Brown, 726 F.3d at 999.  Circumstances 
such as “frequency, regularity and standardization,” for 
example, can just as well apply to someone buying “two 
sticks of deodorant for $3.49 each, every other Friday” at 
Walmart.  Id.   
 
Similarly, everyone engaged in the buying and selling 
of illegal contraband will necessarily exhibit “mutual trust,” 
the same as co-conspirators, “because either buyer or seller 
might be a government informant or turn violent.”  United 
States v. Colon, 549 F.3d at 565, 569 (2d Cir. 2008).   If the 
seller did not trust the buyer, there would never be a sale. 
This ever-present trust, even between mere buyers and sellers, 
should not be a factor in determining whether there is 
sufficient evidence that the purchaser intended to advance the 
seller’s illegal objectives and thereby join the drug 
conspiracy. 
 
III. 
 
No doubt because of the problems of distinguishing 
purchasers from co-conspirators, the Seventh Circuit has 
reworked its factors in a manner consistent with these 
concerns.  That Court now focuses more on whether the buyer 
and seller have stakes in each other's businesses above and 
beyond a traditional buyer-seller relationship.  The Seventh 
Circuit’s non-exhaustive list of factors includes: (1) “sales on 
credit or consignment,” (2) “an agreement to look for other 
customers,” (3) “a payment of commission on sales,” (4) “an 
indication that one party advised the other on the conduct of 
the other’s business,” or (5) “an agreement to warn of future 
threats to each other’s business stemming from competitors or 
law enforcement authorities.”  Brown, 726 F.3d at 999 
(quoting United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 749, 755-56 (7th 
Cir. 2010)).  These factors are a vast improvement over the 
factors we ask juries to consider.  Yet, the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit views this refined list of 
considerations merely as the “starting point” for a buyer-
seller/co-conspirator inquiry.  That Court recognizes that the 
appropriate inquiry must “consider the totality of the 
circumstances . . ., tak[ing] into account all the evidence 
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surrounding the alleged conspiracy . . . [and] not los[ing] 
sight of the larger picture—deciding whether the jury 
reasonably discerned an agreement to further trafficking of 
drugs.”  Id. at 1001-02.  
 
Two recent cases from the Courts of Appeals for the 
Seventh and Second Circuits are instructive and should 
inform our own jurisprudence.  In United States v. Brock, the 
defendant James Dickerson purchased crack cocaine from a 
cooperating conspirator several times each week and resold it 
in $20 baggies.  Brock, 789 F.3d at 62.  Although the District 
Court denied Dickerson’s Rule 29 motion, finding that he had 
“knowledge” of the larger conspiracy, the Second Circuit 
reversed, concluding “the evidence was insufficient to permit 
any rational juror to infer that Dickerson knowingly joined or 
participated in the charged conspiracy.”  Id. at 65.  The Court 
was influenced by the fact that the conspirators “never sold 
crack to Dickerson on credit, and placed no limitations on 
Dickerson’s ability to use or resell the product he purchased,” 
“did not consider Dickerson to be a member of the 
organization, and did not know or care what Dickerson did 
with the drugs after he purchased them,” as well as the fact 
that Dickerson never “shared profits,” had no “interactions 
with [the conspirators] other than the transactions that made 
him a customer,” and never “assisted their operation in any 
capacity.”  Id. at 64.   
 
Similarly, there was no evidence here that Kelly ever 
bought drugs from Alford on credit or that Alford placed any 
limitations on Kelly’s use of the drugs he purchased, nor is 
there any evidence that Kelly shared profits or assisted the 
Alford conspiracy in any way.  Moreover, as noted earlier, the 
Government’s own cooperating witnesses testified that Kelly 
was not a member of the conspiracy in which they were 
members.  
 
In United States v. Pulgar, 789 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 
2015), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that 
despite evidence of a close friendship between a defendant 
supplier and purchaser, “[w]ithout evidence of repeated 
fronting, sales on consignment, provisioning of tools or 
supplies, warnings of threats to the business, or some other 
signal that they enjoyed a heightened level of trust indicative 
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of a drug distribution conspiracy, we cannot infer anything 
nefarious from this friendship.”  Id. at 815-16.  Kelly’s trial is 
similarly devoid of evidence of fronting, consignment sales, 
provisioning of tools or supplies, warnings, or any other 
evidence of a shared conspiratorial stake between Kelly and 
Alford. 
 
There is evidence that, in one of the seven out of 
60,000 phone calls that were intercepted on Alford’s phone 
where Kelly and Alford spoke, Kelly asked Alford how to 
process powder cocaine into crack cocaine.  Kelly apparently 
did not know how to “cook” crack and he asked Alford for 
assistance.  See J.A. at 585–89, 1249–51.  Relying on the 
factors allowed under Gibbs, my colleagues conclude “a 
rational trier of fact could interpret [this] to demonstrate 
Kelly’s role as a processor and distributor of crack and as a 
co-conspirator of Alford.”  NPO at 4.   That simply does not 
follow. Even under the illusory guidance of Gibbs, it is 
difficult to understand why asking a seller of cocaine how to 
convert it to crack is evidence that the purchaser had entered 
into a conspiratorial agreement with the seller beyond the 
sales transaction or that he intended to advance the seller’s 
enterprise.  Such evidence only proves that Kelly did not 
know how to “cook” powder cocaine into crack, and that he 
assumed his seller, Alford, would be able to tell him how to 
accomplish that.  Conspiracies should be made of sterner stuff 
than this.   
 
IV. 
 
Given the extent to which illegal drugs and illegal drug 
sales continue to devastate and destroy lives and 
communities, I have no doubt that we will have another 
opportunity to revisit the factors we use in attempting to 
distinguish between purchasers and co-conspirators.  
Regrettably, in the interim we also will no doubt expose 
numerous purchasers of drugs (even those who purchase 
merely to “feed” their own addiction) to the exponentially 
greater penalties that attach to being a member of a drug 
conspiracy.  I therefore take this opportunity to express my 
concern that we are failing to afford jurors the guidance they 
need and that the law requires in deciding whether evidence is 
sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in 
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cases such as this.  Worse yet, the “guidance” that we do give 
jurors is not only less than helpful, it is misleading because it 
can be an open invitation to convict mere purchasers of illegal 
drugs of the far more serious crime of being a member of a 
drug conspiracy.  Accordingly, I now echo the concern 
expressed by Judge Becker a decade and a half ago and 
explain why we should avail ourselves of this opportunity and 
grant Kelly’s petition for rehearing.  
 
